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Low 27 Bitcoin

Add Drop to PrivateKey and Keypair

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Mitchell Bagot

68/100 · Adequate
Add Drop to PrivateKey and Keypair

With Copy removed from both PrivateKey and Keypair, we can now
introduce drop on the types. This allows us to call through to
non_secure_erase on the underlying type when these types are dropped.

Introduce Drop implementation for Keypair and PrivateKey.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds automatic memory clearing when Bitcoin private key objects are destroyed. It is a defensive hardening change, not a fix for an active vulnerability. The change reduces the chance that secret key material lingers in memory after use, but the commit itself does not claim to fix any known exploit.

Recommended action

No immediate action required. Treat as routine hardening. If relying on this for key security, ensure broader practices such as mlock, guarded heap allocations, and secure enclaves are also used, since Drop-based clearing is not sufficient alone.

Security signals we found

01

secret-key memory clearing on drop

02

removal of Copy prerequisite for Drop

03

defensive hardening against memory-resident key leakage

Risk score

Why this scored 27/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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