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Informational 17 Bitcoin

units: Remove serde derives from all types

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Mitchell Bagot

68/100 · Adequate
units: Remove serde derives from all types

The serde derive feature introduces various additional dependencies to
the dependency graph. Since derives are harder to reason about, and
slow down the compilation with extra deps, it's better to simply provide
explicit serde impls for all types and drop the feature.

Remove serde derive feature from units.
Replace all serde derives with explicit impls for all remaining types.

Assisted by: Claude Opus 5.5
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes the automatic serde (serialization/deserialization) derive feature from the `units` crate and replaces it with hand-written implementations. The stated goal is to reduce compile-time dependencies and make the code easier to reason about. There is no direct security fix here, but any change to serialization behavior carries a small risk of accidentally altering how data is encoded or decoded, which could affect downstream users relying on stable formats.

Recommended action

Review the manual serde implementations for format parity with the previous derive-based behavior, especially for `CompactTarget` and `Sequence` where the consensus `u32` representation is used. Run the existing serde round-trip tests and consider adding tests that compare serialized bytes before and after this change if not already present. No urgent security patch is indicated.

Security signals we found

01

Behavior-preserving refactor of serialization code

02

Removal of serde derive dependency reduces macro-generated code and supply-chain surface

03

Manual serde impls introduce potential for human error in format compatibility

04

No input validation, bounds checking, or cryptographic logic changes visible in diff

Risk score

Why this scored 17/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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