What the developer wrote
Authored by yancy
p2p: use char instead of slice
Using a slice is needlessly complex vs a simple char.
What changed, and why it matters
This is a tiny code cleanup in the Bitcoin peer-to-peer networking code. It replaces a slightly more verbose way of stripping trailing null characters with a simpler, equivalent way. There is no security impact.
No action required. This is a non-functional refactor.
Security signals we found
No strong security signals were identified.
Evidence from the diff
The change modifies p2p/src/message.rs in the CommandString::as_ref implementation. It changes trim_end_matches(&['\0'][..]) to trim_end_matches('\0'). Both forms are functionally equivalent because trim_end_matches accepts either a char or a pattern, and a single-character slice pattern behaves the same as the character itself. The unsafe block remains unchanged and is still justified by the same ASCII invariant comment.
Changed components
p2p/src/message.rsCommandString::as_refInspect captured patch +1 / −1
diff --git a/p2p/src/message.rs b/p2p/src/message.rs
index 8dc34c88..8bf6ac0d 100644
--- a/p2p/src/message.rs
+++ b/p2p/src/message.rs
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ impl AsRef<str> for CommandString {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &str {
// CommandStringDecode upholds the invarient that only valid
// ASCII characters will be decoded.
- unsafe { std::str::from_utf8_unchecked(&self.0).trim_end_matches(&['\0'][..]) }
+ unsafe { std::str::from_utf8_unchecked(&self.0).trim_end_matches('\0') }
}
}
Why this scored 15/100
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