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Moderate 59 Cryptographic libraries

wallet: propagate TLS verification to native and RPC wallets

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by woodser

60/100 · Adequate
wallet: propagate TLS verification to native and RPC wallets
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes how Java wallet code passes TLS/SSL certificate verification settings down to the underlying native Monero wallet and to RPC wallets. Previously, the Java layer could request 'verify the certificate' or 'allow any certificate,' but that setting was not reliably forwarded across the JNI bridge or translated into the correct RPC parameters. The patch renames several native methods, adds an ssl_verify flag through the bridge, and makes the RPC wallet honor the connection's verification preference. It also fixes a related bug where changing a connection's SSL setting changed its hash code, which could break connection-manager tracking.

Recommended action

Treat as a security-hardening fix and include in release notes. Users relying on TLS verification against malicious or misconfigured daemons should upgrade. Review whether prior versions silently disabled verification or ignored user settings; if so, consider a CVE and advisory. Verify the updated monero-cpp submodule contains matching SSL verification support.

Security signals we found

01

TLS/SSL verification preference now propagated across JNI to native wallet

02

RPC wallet now translates connection sslVerify into ssl_allow_any_cert and ssl_support parameters

03

Connection equality/hashCode now includes sslVerify, preventing silent mismatches

04

Connection manager response-time map keyed by URI to survive hash changes

05

Tests assert that explicit SslOptions cannot be weakened by connection settings

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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