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Low 35 Cryptographic libraries

wallet rpc: reset snapshots when switching wallets

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by woodser

65/100 · Adequate
wallet rpc: reset snapshots when switching wallets

Invalidate stale polls and callbacks across wallet lifecycle changes.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a lifecycle bug in the Monero Java wallet library. When a user switches from one wallet to another, background polling and notification threads could keep running with stale data from the previous wallet. The patch adds generation counters so old callbacks are cancelled and snapshots are reset when a wallet is switched or cleared. The main risk is that, without the fix, an application might briefly report wrong balances, transactions, or events from a previous wallet after switching wallets, which could confuse users or trick downstream code. There is no direct evidence in the commit of remote code execution or theft of funds.

Recommended action

Treat as a lifecycle-correctness fix worth including in the next release. Review whether any other background tasks or caches in the wallet layer also need generation-based invalidation. If this fix was prompted by a user-visible bug, consider adding a regression test that switches wallets and asserts no stale events are delivered. No emergency response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

stale callback invalidation across wallet lifecycle changes

02

generation-counter pattern to prevent use of stale snapshots

03

background poller and ZMQ listener reset on wallet clear/switch

04

listener iteration now copies set and checks membership/generation

05

no explicit security framing by vendor in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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