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Informational 21 Monero

Merge pull request #4665

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

51/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #4665

a33f242 wizard: support key-based monero-wallet restore QR codes (selsta)

ACKs: jpk68
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a feature that lets users scan a QR code to restore a Monero wallet from its secret keys. The change itself is a feature addition, not a fix for a known vulnerability. There is one minor security-relevant detail: the QR code URI scheme was changed from 'monero_wallet:' to 'monero-wallet:' and a new parser was added. The code validates the wallet address before accepting the QR data, which is good. However, the new parser does not validate the secret view/spend keys or restore height values, so a malformed QR code could at worst cause the restore wizard to receive invalid key strings. There is no evidence in the commit of a disclosed security bug, an exploit, or an attacker-controlled code path.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine feature commit. As a defensive measure, reviewers may optionally recommend adding validation for secret key length/hex format and numeric restore height in parseWalletRestoreUri() before passing values to the restore wizard, to improve robustness against malformed QR codes. No urgent security action is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

New QR URI parser handles secret keys (secret_view_key, secret_spend_key) and restore height

02

Address validation is performed before accepting parsed restore URI

03

Scheme changed from monero_wallet: to monero-wallet:

04

No input validation on decoded key strings or restore height beyond URI decoding

05

No evidence of vulnerability disclosure, CVE, or security advisory in commit materials

Risk score

Why this scored 21/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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