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Low 27 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11697

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #11697

46cfa05 wallet: add n-of-n multisig fast non-interactive setup (jpk68)

ACKs: UkoeHB, selsta
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds an optional, faster way to set up N-of-N Monero multisig wallets. Normally, all signers must complete a final verification round to prove they are active and have finished setup. The new 'fast non-interactive setup' skips that final round for convenience, but the code and user-facing warnings clearly note the trade-off: you cannot be sure the other signers are alive or finished, so funds sent to the shared address could become permanently inaccessible if any signer failed. The change is explicitly opt-in, gated by warnings, and restricted to N-of-N (e.g., 2-of-2, 3-of-3) setups. It is not a bug fix or a secret backdoor; it is a documented feature with a known risk.

Recommended action

Treat this as a feature addition with a documented operational risk, not as a vulnerability. Reviewers and users should ensure they understand the warning: only use the fast setup when all signers are trusted, available, and capable of completing setup; otherwise funds may be locked. No immediate patch is required, but wallet maintainers may want to confirm that the force_update path cannot be triggered accidentally through the normal RPC/API flow.

Security signals we found

01

New feature adds a non-default, opt-in fast setup path that intentionally weakens a liveness/verification guarantee

02

Force-update flag (force_update_use_with_caution) is used internally to bypass the normal post-KEX round

03

User-facing and API documentation clearly warn that funds may become inaccessible if other signers do not complete setup

04

No input sanitization changes beyond existing make_multisig/exchange_multisig_keys validation; relies on existing multisig account checks

05

Functional and unit tests cover valid N-of-N cases, mixed fast/normal setups, and invalid threshold/signer combinations

Risk score

Why this scored 27/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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