What changed, and why it matters
This small change updates how Monero's wallet handles error responses from a remote node when creating or verifying a 'spend proof'. Before, the wallet would treat certain node-reported errors as fatal even when using an untrusted node. Now it filters those status codes through a trust-aware helper, so untrusted nodes cannot as easily disrupt or mislead spend-proof operations with crafted error responses. In practical terms, it makes the wallet more cautious about what it believes from a node it does not trust.
Treat as a low-to-moderate hardening fix. Users and integrators running wallets against untrusted remote nodes should update. A security advisory is not strongly indicated by the commit alone, but the change is worth including in release notes under wallet hardening.
Security signals we found
Untrusted daemon RPC status filtering
Spend proof integrity / denial-of-service hardening
Change in error-handling path for get_outs.bin
No explicit vulnerability description in commit message
Evidence from the diff
In wallet2.cpp, both get_spend_proof() and check_spend_proof() now pass res.status through get_rpc_status(m_trusted_daemon, res.status) before THROW_ON_RPC_RESPONSE_ERROR evaluates it. The get_rpc_status helper is commonly used in Monero to downgrade or reinterpret RPC status codes when the daemon is untrusted, preventing untrusted daemon error statuses from being treated as hard failures. The patch is a two-line change and appears to be a hardening fix rather than a full redesign.
Changed components
src/wallet/wallet2.cppwallet2::get_spend_proofwallet2::check_spend_proofdaemon RPC status handlingInspect captured patch +2 / −2
### src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
@@ -12337,7 +12337,7 @@ std::string wallet2::get_spend_proof(const crypto::hash &txid, const std::string
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::recursive_mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/get_outs.bin", req, res, *m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
- THROW_ON_RPC_RESPONSE_ERROR(r, {}, res, "get_outs.bin", error::get_outs_error, res.status);
+ THROW_ON_RPC_RESPONSE_ERROR(r, {}, res, "get_outs.bin", error::get_outs_error, get_rpc_status(m_trusted_daemon, res.status));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.outs.size() != ring_size, error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(res.outs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(ring_size));
@@ -12463,7 +12463,7 @@ bool wallet2::check_spend_proof(const crypto::hash &txid, const std::string &mes
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::recursive_mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/get_outs.bin", req, res, *m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
- THROW_ON_RPC_RESPONSE_ERROR(r, {}, res, "get_outs.bin", error::get_outs_error, res.status);
+ THROW_ON_RPC_RESPONSE_ERROR(r, {}, res, "get_outs.bin", error::get_outs_error, get_rpc_status(m_trusted_daemon, res.status));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.outs.size() != req.outputs.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(res.outs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(req.outputs.size()));Why this scored 37/100
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