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Low 43 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11412

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #11412

947167d ringct: revert range proof proving enum vals (jeffro256)

ACKs: plowsof, jpk68
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This tiny change reassigns numeric values to two internal labels used for Monero's range proof types. Instead of the labels automatically getting consecutive numbers (0, 1), they are now explicitly set to 0 and 3. The commit message says it 'reverts' an earlier change that had assigned them consecutive values. This is likely a backward-compatibility or serialization fix, because stored data or network messages may already expect the value 3 for the newer bulletproof range proof. On its own the patch does not look like an active exploit, but a mismatch in these numeric values could in theory cause two versions of the software to disagree about transaction data, which can be a security concern in a cryptocurrency.

Recommended action

Treat this as a consensus-compatibility fix rather than a vulnerability patch. Review the preceding commit that introduced the consecutive enum values to confirm whether it caused an actual incompatibility, and verify that all serialization paths (binary archive, JSON, wire protocol) now use the restored values consistently. Run integration tests that exercise bulletproof range proofs across mixed node versions.

Security signals we found

01

Enum value change with potential serialization/consensus implications

02

Revert of a prior enum numbering change

03

No explicit security explanation in commit message

04

Single-line change in a core RingCT type header

Risk score

Why this scored 43/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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