AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 50 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11574

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

63/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11574

bcdd241 zmq: fix overflow in get_output_histogram recent_cutoff check (jpk68)

ACKs: Ap4sh, selsta
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a time comparison bug in Monero's restricted RPC daemon. The old code constructed a clock time point from a user-supplied number of seconds, which could overflow or produce a wildly wrong date. It then compared that date to 'now' to decide whether the requested histogram cutoff was too old. The new code converts 'now' to a plain second count, subtracts the allowed restricted window, and compares the resulting boundary directly against the user's value. This avoids constructing a time point from untrusted input and makes the age check more reliable. The practical security effect is likely limited because the call is only relevant on restricted RPC endpoints and the worst outcome appears to be an incorrect rejection or acceptance of a histogram request, not direct loss of funds or remote code execution.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-to-moderate reliability/security hardening fix. Apply the patch, run existing RPC tests for get_output_histogram with boundary and large recent_cutoff values, and consider adding a regression test that exercises the maximum uint64_t recent_cutoff case on restricted RPC.

Security signals we found

01

integer/time representation overflow in cutoff validation

02

restricted RPC input used to construct chrono time_point

03

comparison logic rewritten to avoid epoch-second wraparound

04

patch is small and defensive, not a full feature change

Risk score

Why this scored 50/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 10/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.