AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Informational 23 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11365

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

66/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11365

af7d613 wallet_rpc: add get_wallet_info (SNeedlewoods)
67dc8ea wallet: add get_proxy (SNeedlewoods)

ACKs: selsta, jpk68
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new read-only wallet command called get_wallet_info that lets an authenticated user ask the wallet for basic metadata such as the wallet file name, address, wallet type, which network it is on, the daemon address, and any configured proxy. It also fixes a small consistency bug where the stored proxy setting was not updated when set_proxy was called. The change is informational only: it does not move, spend, or expose private keys, and it is blocked in restricted RPC mode. The main security consideration is that it makes it slightly easier for a logged-in RPC user to learn the wallet's network setup, which could help target further attacks if the RPC endpoint is already compromised.

Recommended action

No urgent action is required. Operators already running wallet RPC with untrusted users should ensure restricted mode is enabled and RPC access is authenticated and firewalled. Reviewers may want to confirm that get_wallet_info does not inadvertently return sensitive fields such as the full wallet path on shared systems, and that the proxy fix covers all callers of set_proxy.

Security signals we found

01

New RPC endpoint exposes wallet metadata including daemon address and proxy configuration

02

Endpoint is denied in restricted RPC mode, reducing exposure for shared/public RPC setups

03

Proxy state consistency fix removes stale m_proxy value after set_daemon/set_proxy calls

04

No private key, seed, or spend-authorization logic is touched

Risk score

Why this scored 23/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.