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Moderate 59 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11260

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #11260

1c7ba69 tx/partial tx validation hardening (koe)

ACKs: selsta, thomasbuilds, jpk68
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This Monero wallet patch adds stronger safety checks when a wallet prepares, signs, or loads multi-step transactions (unsigned transactions, multisig transactions, and cold-device transactions). It verifies that money going into the transaction is not counted twice, that change addresses really belong to the wallet, that outputs do not exceed inputs, and that destination address types stay consistent. These are defensive hardening measures against mistakes or maliciously crafted transaction files that could otherwise make the wallet sign an invalid or harmful transaction.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-hardening fix and include it in the next release. Users who create, sign, or load unsigned/multisig/cold transactions should upgrade. Wallet integrators should verify their transaction-export/import formats pass the new validation and review any custom tooling that constructs tx_construction_data or pending_tx structures.

Security signals we found

01

Adds duplicate-input detection across transaction sets

02

Adds destination address type consistency checks

03

Adds uint64 overflow guard for summed input amounts

04

Validates change address ownership against wallet account/subaddresses

05

Enforces output amount <= input amount and change <= change-address amount

06

Replaces memcpy amount encoding with proper rct::d2h conversion

07

Wires validation into unsigned tx parsing, signing, multisig, and cold-signing flows

08

Introduces set-level sanity checks (sanity_check_unsigned_tx_set, sanity_check_pending_tx_set)

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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