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Low 28 Cryptographic libraries

wallet2: abort in-flight daemon request on shutdown

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by woodser

50/100 · Thin
wallet2: abort in-flight daemon request on shutdown
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Monero wallet's HTTP client tears down network connections when the wallet shuts down. It adds a new 'shutdown' path that can interrupt blocked network operations from another thread or even a Unix signal handler, so the wallet stops promptly instead of hanging on a slow or unresponsive daemon. The change is framed by the author as a robustness/cleanup improvement, not as a fix for an active security vulnerability. It does not appear to introduce obvious new attack surface, but it touches low-level socket and SSL code where bugs could in principle create crashes or race conditions.

Recommended action

Treat as a hardening/robustness patch rather than an urgent security fix. Reviewers should verify the new self-pipe and atomic abort logic for race conditions, especially around SSL handshake cancellation and destructor ordering. Users running wallet software built from source should include this commit to ensure clean shutdown behavior. No CVE or advisory action is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

New shutdown path designed to be async-signal-safe on POSIX (only atomics and write() to self-pipe)

02

Replaces prior shutdown() that performed blocking socket operations and was not safe to call from signal handlers or other threads

03

Adds sticky atomic abort flag to prevent new operations after teardown

04

Closes sockets when abort is detected in send/recv/connect/handshake paths

05

Adds unit tests covering abort from another thread and from a signal handler

06

No mention of CVE, advisory, or external report in commit or supplied references

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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