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Moderate 57 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11696

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #11696

3b24f26 wallet2: bind v1 spend proofs to the requested transaction (Samy)

ACKs: jpk68, selsta
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change refactors how Monero's wallet fetches transaction data when creating or verifying 'spend proofs'—cryptographic receipts that prove you spent funds. Previously, spend-proof code fetched transactions directly from the network daemon in two separate places. Now it uses a single helper function, and importantly, that helper now passes through a configurable network timeout and reports daemon errors more precisely. The commit title says the goal is to bind v1 spend proofs to the requested transaction, suggesting the previous code may have used the wrong transaction under some edge cases. However, the diff itself does not show a clear bug being fixed; it mostly consolidates duplicated code and tightens error handling.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine correctness/hardening fix. Review the full PR #11696 discussion and any release notes to confirm whether this addressed an exploitable proof-forgery or wrong-transaction issue. If running a wallet that creates or verifies spend proofs, update to the patched version once it is included in a release. No immediate emergency action is warranted based solely on this diff.

Security signals we found

01

Refactoring of spend-proof transaction lookup to a single helper

02

Addition of explicit RPC timeout parameter to transaction fetch helper

03

Improved daemon RPC error/status reporting in get_tx_for_proof

04

Commit title implies binding of v1 spend proofs to requested transaction

05

No explicit vulnerability description or CVE in commit message

Risk score

Why this scored 57/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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