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Moderate 56 Cryptographic libraries

p2p, rpc: group public IPv6 connection limits by /64

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by selsta

50/100 · Thin
p2p, rpc: group public IPv6 connection limits by /64
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens Monero's connection limits for public IPv6 addresses. Previously, limits were applied per individual IP address, which is ineffective on IPv6 because a single attacker can easily obtain a huge block of addresses (a /64 subnet). The change groups all public IPv6 addresses within the same /64 subnet together for both P2P and RPC connection limits, so they share a single connection allowance. Private, loopback, link-local, and similar special IPv6 addresses are still treated individually.

Recommended action

Deploy as part of normal hardening; no emergency response required. Operators running public nodes on IPv6 should verify that the updated limits match their capacity planning, since a /64 now shares one limit instead of each address having its own. Review whether the default of 1 connection per /64 for P2P and RPC is appropriate for your deployment.

Security signals we found

01

Rate-limit bypass mitigation: per-address limits are ineffective against IPv6 /64 subnets, which are trivially enumerable by an attacker.

02

P2P and RPC connection limits now share a counter across a public IPv6 /64 prefix.

03

Special IPv6 scopes (loopback, link-local, unique-local, site-local, multicast, unspecified, IPv4-mapped) are excluded from grouping to avoid over-aggregating legitimate local traffic.

04

No authentication, cryptographic, or memory-safety changes; this is a network-layer resource-control hardening patch.

Risk score

Why this scored 56/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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