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Moderate 60 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11428

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

63/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11428

0de7298 portable_binary_iarchive: check signature length before allocating (woodser)

ACKs: jpk68, selsta
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a way that a malformed file could trick Monero's Boost-based archive reader into trying to allocate a huge amount of memory. Before the fix, the reader would trust the length value encoded in the input and resize a string to that size, which could exhaust memory or crash the program. Now it first checks that the claimed length matches the expected archive signature length before allocating.

Recommended action

Treat this as a hardening fix with possible denial-of-service security relevance. Apply the patch and consider fuzzing archive deserialization paths. No immediate remote code execution evidence is present in the diff.

Security signals we found

01

Potential denial-of-service via memory exhaustion from untrusted length prefix

02

Input validation added for length before memory allocation

03

Fix is in a deserialization/archive parsing code path

Risk score

Why this scored 60/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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