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Moderate 59 Cryptographic libraries

Harden HTTP client auth

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Lee *!* Clagett

33/100 · Opaque
Harden HTTP client auth
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens how Monero's built-in HTTP client handles password-based authentication (HTTP Digest). It removes support for an older, weaker mode that did not use a client nonce ('cnonce'), and now always generates a random cnonce using OpenSSL's secure random generator. This makes replay and certain man-in-the-middle attacks against the HTTP client harder. The change also updates the tests to expect the new, stricter behavior.

Recommended action

Treat as a security hardening fix. Users and downstreams should apply the patch. Review whether any legitimate server configurations relied on the removed qop-less RFC 2069 mode, since those will now fail authentication. No immediate incident response is indicated beyond normal patching.

Security signals we found

01

Use of cryptographically secure random (OpenSSL RAND_bytes) for cnonce generation

02

Removal of fallback to RFC 2069 digest mode lacking client nonce

03

Addition of cnonce to Authorization header and response digest

04

Test expectations changed to reject qop-less digest authentication

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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