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Moderate 62 Cryptographic libraries

Merge pull request #11551

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tobtoht

68/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11551

0467659 wallet: use parsed daemon host for proxy verification (Samy)

ACKs: jpk68, selsta
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This Monero wallet update fixes how the wallet checks whether a daemon address is a special privacy-protected .onion or .i2p address when using a proxy or SSL. Before the fix, the wallet could be tricked by unusual addresses containing spaces, tabs, null characters, or IPv6 scope symbols into thinking an ordinary internet address was a trusted .onion/.i2p address, which would let it skip required SSL certificate checks. That could allow a malicious daemon to impersonate a trusted node and potentially spy on or manipulate wallet traffic. The patch now properly parses the URL and rejects suspicious characters before deciding whether strong verification is needed.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security fix and include it in the next release. Users who run monero-wallet-cli or monero-wallet-rpc with --proxy or daemon SSL enabled should upgrade, because prior versions could be misled into skipping certificate verification against non-.onion/.i2p hosts. Review any custom daemon-address handling elsewhere in the codebase for the same substring-vs-parse and control-character issues.

Security signals we found

01

Bypass of strong SSL/TLS verification requirement for proxy/SSL mode

02

Host extraction via substring instead of URL parsing

03

Insufficient validation of control characters in daemon host

04

IPv6 scope ID (%suffix) could alter .onion/.i2p suffix matching

05

Functional tests include explicit bypass payloads and expected failures

Risk score

Why this scored 62/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 9/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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