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High 78 Cryptographic libraries

fix T,U,V generator raw values

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by jeffro256

45/100 · Thin
fix T,U,V generator raw values
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes three special cryptographic constants—named T, U, and V—used in Monero's upcoming FCMP++ privacy protocol. These constants are like fixed 'reference points' on a mathematical curve that the protocol relies on to prove transactions are valid without revealing who sent what. The old values were apparently copied from an outdated source and were wrong; the new values match the updated reference implementation. If the wrong constants had gone live, Monero's privacy proofs could have been broken or forged, potentially allowing someone to create fake coins or trace transactions. The commit itself only updates the byte strings and their sanity-check first bytes; it does not explain how the error was discovered or whether any real funds were at risk.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-priority cryptographic correction. Independently re-derive the new T/U/V values from the documented hash-to-curve procedure (unbiased_hash_to_ec(Keccak256(domain label))) and compare against both the monero-oxide reference and the committed bytes. Add regression tests that re-derive and verify every generator at build or test time, and require two-party review for any future change to cryptographic constants. If these wrong values were ever present in a released or testnet build, assess whether any proofs or transactions need to be invalidated or rescanned.

Security signals we found

01

Cryptographic generator constants changed without explanation of root cause

02

Old constants sourced from an outdated third-party reference

03

New constants sourced from a newer third-party reference

04

No unit test or verification code added in the diff

05

Static sanity checks updated to match new first bytes, but no full-curve validation shown

06

Potential impact on FCMP++ proof soundness/privacy if wrong values were deployed

Risk score

Why this scored 78/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 25/30
Exploitability 20/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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