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Moderate 63 Cryptographic libraries

cryptonote_basic: parse_and_validate_tx param to check max size

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by j-berman

85/100 · Strong
cryptonote_basic: parse_and_validate_tx param to check max size

Simple API to check max blob size before parsing. This is useful
when reading blobs from untrusted sources.

@selsta pointed out that coinbase txs can technically be larger
than get_max_tx_size(), otherwise we could enforce it on all txs.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This Monero commit adds an optional size check to transaction parsing functions so that oversized transaction blobs from untrusted network sources are rejected before being decoded. It is a defensive hardening change that consolidates existing size checks and extends them to more code paths, reducing the chance that a maliciously large blob could waste resources or trigger memory-related issues during parsing.

Recommended action

Treat as a security hardening improvement. Review that all network-facing callers now pass `max_size_check=true` and that `get_max_tx_size()` remains consistent with consensus rules. Consider whether any remaining untrusted callers still use the default false value. No immediate incident response is indicated by the commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Adds explicit maximum-size validation before binary deserialization of untrusted transaction blobs

02

Enables size checks on network-facing transaction parsing paths (P2P protocol, core tx handling, relayed transactions)

03

Removes redundant size check in protocol handler in favor of centralized parsing API check

04

Comment notes coinbase transactions are intentionally exempt from the cap

05

Default parameter value of false preserves existing behavior for internal/trusted callers

Risk score

Why this scored 63/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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