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High 71 Cryptographic libraries

tx/partial tx validation hardening

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by koe

68/100 · Adequate
tx/partial tx validation hardening

* harden load_multisig_tx for fully signed txs
* fix memcpy endianness issue
* validate destination types across transaction sets + check consistent inputs
* wallet: validate transaction set amounts
* wallet: validate unsigned transaction change ownership
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This Monero wallet commit adds stronger safety checks when handling unsigned, partially signed, and fully signed transactions before they are signed or broadcast. It prevents several risky situations: reusing the same coin across multiple transactions, sending change to an address that does not belong to the wallet, mismatched destination address types, and a byte-order bug when verifying encrypted payment amounts. These are defensive hardening fixes in transaction validation code paths that handle sensitive user funds.

Recommended action

Treat this commit as a security-hardening patch and include it in the next release. Wallet operators and integrators should upgrade, especially those using multisig, cold-signing, or unsigned/signed transaction file workflows. No immediate public incident response is indicated, but downstream forks and wallet implementations should review equivalent validation gaps.

Security signals we found

01

Prevention of duplicate input pubkeys across transaction sets (avoids double-spend / same-input reuse within a set)

02

Change-address ownership validation for unsigned transactions (prevents change theft / misdirected change)

03

Transaction-set amount validation: outputs <= inputs and change <= change-address payments (prevents value inflation / inconsistent accounting)

04

Destination type consistency check across transaction sets (normal vs subaddress mismatch detection)

05

Endianness fix in amount encoding reproduction during output validation

06

Hardened `load_multisig_tx` to require known key images and full validation before persisting tx metadata

07

Set-level validation applied to unsigned tx parsing, sign_tx, multisig sign/load, cold signing, and signed tx parsing

Risk score

Why this scored 71/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 16/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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