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Low 35 Bitcoin

multi: skip range check in pathfinder and switch for custom htlc payments

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ziggie

50/100 · Thin
multi: skip range check in pathfinder and switch for custom htlc payments
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Lightning Network Daemon (LND) handles 'custom HTLC' payments. Normally, LND enforces minimum and maximum amount limits on forwarded payments to prevent abuse and routing loops. For custom HTLCs—special payments that carry extra data and may use non-Bitcoin assets—these amount checks are now skipped in both the routing pathfinder and the actual forwarding switch. The change is described by the authors as intentional and needed to avoid routing loops, not as a security fix. It narrows a safety guard for a specific payment type, which could matter if the custom-channel logic has bugs or is misused.

Recommended action

Reviewers should verify that custom HTLCs are indeed only locally sourced and that the AuxTrafficShaper/IsCustomHTLC classification cannot be manipulated by an external peer to route arbitrary amounts. Consider adding tests that confirm non-custom HTLCs still trigger the range check, and that custom HTLCs cannot be crafted by remote forwarding parties. If custom channels are externally reachable, evaluate whether additional amount or rate-limit checks are needed.

Security signals we found

01

Policy bypass: minimum and maximum HTLC amount checks are skipped for payments classified as custom HTLCs.

02

Scope is limited to custom HTLCs, which the commit says are locally sourced and use non-routable custom channels.

03

The change is in two places: routing path selection and actual link forwarding, so both planning and execution of a payment skip the range check.

04

No explicit bounds checking is added elsewhere to compensate for the skipped range check for custom HTLCs.

05

Commit message and comments describe the change as avoiding routing loops caused by unpersisted link errors, not as a vulnerability fix.

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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