AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 45 Bitcoin

funding: enforce BOLT-02 push_msat bound on fundee

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Erick Cestari

73/100 · Adequate
funding: enforce BOLT-02 push_msat bound on fundee

Reject incoming OpenChannel messages where push_msat exceeds
1000 * funding_satoshis, as required by BOLT-02. The existing RejectPush
flag only gates on push_msat > 0 and does not cover the spec bound.

An over-sized push is eventually caught downstream in reservation.go when
theirBalance = capacity - fee - push_msat goes negative and
ErrFunderBalanceDust is returned. Rejecting it up front produces a
clearer, spec-aligned error and avoids the chanacceptor and commitment
type negotiation round-trips for a channel we will refuse anyway.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens validation in LND when another node asks to open a Lightning channel. It now rejects requests where the proposed 'push' payment is larger than the entire channel funding, as the Lightning protocol (BOLT-02) already requires. Before this change, such oversized pushes were only caught later in the process, after extra setup work. The change is a defensive hardening fix, not an active exploit patch, and the commit message frames it as spec compliance rather than a security vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-to-moderate hardening improvement. No urgent incident response is indicated by the commit itself. Review whether any other protocol bounds in OpenChannel validation are similarly deferred downstream.

Security signals we found

01

BOLT-02 spec-bound enforcement added for push_msat

02

Previously oversized push only failed downstream with less specific ErrFunderBalanceDust

03

New explicit error type ErrPushAmountTooLarge introduced

04

Validation moved earlier in funding flow, before chanacceptor and commitment negotiation

05

Test coverage added for both above-bound and at-bound behavior

Risk score

Why this scored 45/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.