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Low 43 Bitcoin

funding: reject public taproot opens before sending

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by yyforyongyu

50/100 · Thin
funding: reject public taproot opens before sending
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a safety check in LND's channel-opening code to prevent users from accidentally creating public (advertised) Taproot payment channels. The current Taproot channel implementation is only meant for private channels, so the patch now rejects such requests locally before any network message is sent. It also adds tests to confirm both sides of the channel-opening handshake reject public Taproot channels.

Recommended action

Treat as a hardening/defensive fix. Review whether the responder-side rejection is robust enough or whether a matching explicit guard should be added on the responder side, since the current diff only shows a generic 'internal error' wire response. No immediate incident response is indicated.

Security signals we found

01

New input-validation guard restricting a protocol feature combination

02

Test coverage added for both initiator and responder rejection paths

03

Change is defensive: blocks public Taproot channel opens that were previously allowed

Risk score

Why this scored 43/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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