AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 39 Bitcoin

server: do not auto-enable RBF coop close for overlay channels

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by George Tsagkarelis

85/100 · Strong
server: do not auto-enable RBF coop close for overlay channels

An earlier commit added an auto-enable that forces RbfCoopClose=true
whenever either taproot channel flag is set. This breaks
taproot-overlay channels, because the RBF coop close state machine in
lnwallet/chancloser/rbf_coop_*.go does not integrate the AuxCloser
(or any other aux) hook that overlay channels depend on to build
aux-aware close transactions. A node that enables
--protocol.simple-taproot-overlay-chans ends up with RBF force-on and
its overlay channel closes silently fail, leaving the aux closer
unable to finalize on-chain.

Narrow the auto-enable so it only fires for TaprootChans (staging /
final taproot) and explicitly skips it when TaprootOverlayChans is set.
Operators that positively want RBF can still opt in via
--protocol.rbf-coop-close; this change only removes the forced path
that silently breaks overlay closes.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a configuration bug in the LND Lightning node software. Previously, enabling experimental 'taproot-overlay' channels automatically forced on a related but incompatible 'RBF cooperative close' feature. That combination would silently break channel closings for those overlay channels. The patch narrows the auto-enable so it does not apply when overlay channels are turned on, while users who want RBF can still opt in manually. There is no attacker exploit here; it is a reliability/functional bug fix.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal bug fix. Users running --protocol.simple-taproot-overlay-chans should upgrade to avoid silent cooperative close failures. No emergency security response is warranted because the issue is a reliability incompatibility, not an exploitable vulnerability.

Security signals we found

01

Functional bug in feature flag interaction

02

Silent failure of channel close operations

03

No input validation or memory safety issue visible

04

No cryptographic or network-level vulnerability evident

Risk score

Why this scored 39/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.