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Low 37 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #8754 from ViktorT-11/2024-05-add-outbound-remote-signer

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Yong

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #8754 from ViktorT-11/2024-05-add-outbound-remote-signer

Add `Outbound` Remote Signer implementation
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new 'outbound' remote-signer mode to LND. In the existing 'inbound' mode, the watch-only node connects to the signer; in the new 'outbound' mode, the signer node connects out to the watch-only node. The change introduces a dedicated gRPC listener, a new macaroon permission ('remotesigner:generate'), and configuration validation. It is a large feature addition rather than a clear-cut vulnerability fix, but it touches authentication, network exposure, and wallet startup logic, so it has security relevance.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant feature addition requiring review of the new dedicated RPC server's authentication, listener binding, and error handling. Operators should not enable the experimental outbound remote signer in production until the feature is no longer marked experimental and has undergone additional security review. Reviewers should verify the dedicated interceptor correctly rejects missing or under-privileged macaroons and that the shared macaroon service cannot be confused between the main and dedicated RPC servers.

Security signals we found

01

New dedicated gRPC listener and service for remote signer coordination

02

New macaroon permission entity 'remotesigner' with action 'generate' required for inbound signer connections

03

Added integration test verifying unauthorized macaroon is rejected with 'permission denied'

04

Configuration validation prevents simultaneous watch-only and remote-signer modes

05

Wallet readiness is now awaited before key derivation in Main startup

06

All new flags are labeled EXPERIMENTAL in descriptions

07

Dedicated server explicitly disables mandatory RPC middleware enforcement

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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