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Low 31 Bitcoin

build: bump runc to v1.2.8

LL28f80558 View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ryan Loomba

57/100 · Thin
build: bump runc to v1.2.8
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit updates several Go module dependencies, most notably bumping the container runtime library 'runc' from version 1.1.14 to 1.2.8 (and 1.2.0 to 1.2.8 in one submodule). It also updates related indirect dependencies like urfave/cli, coreos/go-systemd, sirupsen/logrus, BurntSushi/toml, moby/sys/user, and golang.org/x/net. The commit message only says 'build: bump runc to v1.2.8' and does not mention any security issue. runc has had serious container escape vulnerabilities in the past, but this diff only shows routine dependency version bumps in module files—no actual code changes or explanation of what vulnerability is being fixed. So this looks like a normal maintenance update rather than a confirmed emergency security patch.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine dependency hygiene update. Verify that CI and integration tests still pass with the new runc and transitive versions. If the project tracks known vulnerabilities, cross-check runc 1.2.8 release notes and golang.org/x/net 0.33.0 for any CVEs that may affect the test harness, but no immediate production mitigation is required because runc is not part of the shipped lnd binary's runtime.

Security signals we found

01

runc version bump from 1.1.14 to 1.2.8

02

golang.org/x/net bumped from 0.25.0 to 0.33.0 in sqldb

03

Dependency-only change with no code or configuration modifications

04

runc is an indirect dependency via ory/dockertest/v3 (test infrastructure)

05

No commit-level mention of CVE, security fix, or researcher attribution

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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