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Informational 19 Bitcoin

routerrpc: dont query for the channel capacity

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ziggie

80/100 · Strong
routerrpc: dont query for the channel capacity

During route retrieval don't query for the channel capacity. We
default to the static incomingAmt of the route. That was already
done previously when the channel was closed or private. The
channel capacity has been deprecated for quite a while so it is
acceptable to avoid the performance hit querying the graph db.

In the next release this field will be removed.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change removes a database lookup for channel capacity when returning a payment route through the RPC interface. Instead of fetching the real channel capacity from the graph database, it now reports the amount flowing through each hop as a stand-in capacity. This is a performance and deprecation cleanup, not a security fix. The included test corrects a subtle bug where every hop was being assigned the route's total amount rather than the amount actually entering that hop.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine performance/cleanup commit. Review whether downstream consumers of the ChanCapacity RPC field rely on exact capacity values, since the field now returns a lower-bound approximation and is scheduled for removal in the next release. No immediate security action is required.

Security signals we found

01

No security framing in commit title or message

02

Change removes graph DB query and replaces real capacity with a lower-bound approximation

03

New regression test fixes per-hop capacity assignment logic

04

No mention of vulnerabilities, CVEs, researchers, or incident response

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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