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Informational 15 Bitcoin

server+docs: construct onion message rate limiters and document config

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Olaoluwa Osuntokun

85/100 · Strong
server+docs: construct onion message rate limiters and document config

With the limiter primitives, config options, and peer-side enforcement
in place, this commit constructs the per-peer and global onion message
rate limiters inside the server's onion messaging setup block,
composes them with NewIngressLimiter, and threads the resulting
IngressLimiter into peer.Config alongside the existing SpawnOnionActor
factory as a single OnionLimiter field. The limiters are only built
when onion messaging is actually enabled so that the disabled path
allocates nothing.

sample-lnd.conf gains commented-out entries for the four new options
with the default values and a short explanation of the ~5 Mbps
worst-case target. The user-facing release note for this feature is
added in a single consolidated commit at the end of the series rather
than split across the commits that introduce it.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a straightforward feature-completion patch: it wires up newly added onion-message rate-limiting code, documents the new configuration options in the sample config file, and passes the limiter into peer setup. There is no bug fix, no security vulnerability being patched, and no indication of an active attack or prior weakness. It is a defensive resource-control feature being enabled, not a response to a disclosed incident.

Recommended action

No security action required; treat as normal feature code review. Operators who enable onion messaging should review the new rate-limiting defaults and adjust per-peer/global kbps and burst values based on peer count and bandwidth expectations as described in sample-lnd.conf.

Security signals we found

01

Adds resource-limiting controls for onion message ingress bandwidth

02

Documents configuration defaults and starvation behavior for operators

03

Only allocates limiters when onion messaging is enabled

04

No vulnerability disclosure, CVE, or incident reference present in commit or materials

Risk score

Why this scored 15/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 0/15
Confidence 10/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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