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Informational 21 Bitcoin

signrpc: implement combined nonce RPC server handlers

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elle Mouton

73/100 · Adequate
signrpc: implement combined nonce RPC server handlers

Add server-side RPC handlers for MuSig2RegisterCombinedNonce and
MuSig2GetCombinedNonce.

The handlers:
- Delegate to the Signer interface methods
- Validate input (session ID format, combined nonce length)
- Include macaroon permissions (generate for register, read for get)

These handlers complete the server-side RPC implementation.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds two new server-side RPC handlers for an advanced multi-signature signing feature called MuSig2. The handlers let a caller register a pre-aggregated combined nonce and retrieve the combined nonce for a signing session. The code delegates to existing signer logic, checks the session ID format, validates the nonce length, and assigns macaroon permissions. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability; it appears to be a normal feature-completion change.

Recommended action

Review the underlying Signer.MuSig2RegisterCombinedNonce and Signer.MuSig2GetCombinedNonce implementations for correct state handling and nonce uniqueness, as the RPC layer itself only performs basic input validation. Ensure macaroon permissions align with the principle of least privilege and that combined nonce registration cannot be used to bypass existing per-participant nonce registration controls.

Security signals we found

01

New RPC surface added to signer subsystem

02

Macaroon permissions assigned: generate for register, read for get

03

Input validation performed for session ID and combined nonce length

04

Delegation to underlying Signer interface methods

Risk score

Why this scored 21/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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