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Informational 18 Bitcoin

lnrpc/routerrpc: add outgoing_node_id to HTLC intercept request

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by bitromortac

85/100 · Strong
lnrpc/routerrpc: add outgoing_node_id to HTLC intercept request

A blinded route may identify the next hop by node ID (next_node_id) rather
than by channel, in which case there is no sender-specified outgoing channel
to report to an HTLC interceptor. Add an outgoing_node_id field to
ForwardHtlcInterceptRequest to carry the next hop's public key for these
forwards, and document that outgoing_requested_chan_id then holds a reserved
sentinel value so that clients switching on a zero channel ID to detect the
exit hop do not misclassify the forward as a final receive.

This commit only adds the schema and regenerated stubs; the fields are
populated by later commits.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit only updates the API definition and auto-generated code for LND's HTLC interceptor. It adds a new optional field, outgoing_requested_node_id, and documents that when a blinded route uses a node ID instead of a channel ID, the existing outgoing_requested_chan_id field will be set to a special reserved value (the maximum unsigned 64-bit integer). The commit explicitly states that the new field is not yet populated by real logic; that will come in later commits. There is no runtime behavior change here, so it does not by itself create a security vulnerability or fix one.

Recommended action

No immediate action required. Treat this as a non-security API/schema change. When reviewing later commits that populate outgoing_requested_node_id, verify that the sentinel value is set consistently and that interceptor clients handle it correctly to avoid misrouting or misclassification of blinded forwards.

Security signals we found

01

No runtime logic changed; only protobuf schema and generated stubs

02

New field is explicitly documented as unpopulated until later commits

03

Sentinel value (MaxUint64) introduced to prevent misclassification of final receive vs node-addressed forward

04

Documentation change is defensive: warns clients not to interpret sentinel channel ID as real channel

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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