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Moderate 63 Bitcoin

feat: Automatically update extensions on startup and on a schedule (#4314)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Vlad Stan

70/100 · Adequate
feat: Automatically update extensions on startup and on a schedule (#4314)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds an automatic extension update feature to LNbits. By default, it checks for and installs newer versions of installed extensions when the server starts, and can repeat that check every 24 hours. Because extensions are downloaded from external repositories and installed without a human reviewing the code, a compromised extension publisher or repository could push malicious code that LNbits would automatically run. The commit does include safeguards—only stable releases from the same source repo, version compatibility checks, and permission checks for WebAssembly extensions—but the feature is enabled by default and relies on the security of third-party extension sources.

Recommended action

Treat this as a supply-chain risk feature. Operators should disable automatic updates (`LNBITS_AUTOUPDATE_EXTENSIONS_ON_STARTUP=false` and `LNBITS_AUTOUPDATE_EXTENSIONS_INTERVAL_HOURS=0`) unless they fully trust every configured extension source. The project should add cryptographic signature verification of extension archives, an audit log of automatic updates, and an admin approval queue before automatic installation. Reviewers should also verify that `download_archive` uses TLS certificate validation and that the temporary backup directory is created with restrictive permissions.

Security signals we found

01

Automatic download and execution of third-party code is enabled by default

02

Update source is the extension's configured source_repo, not a vendor-curated store

03

No code signature or hash verification is visible in the diff beyond existing archive validation helpers

04

WebAssembly extension permission changes block silent updates, but Python extensions have no equivalent permission gate

05

Failed updates restore the previous archive from a temporary backup, reducing corruption risk

06

Shutdown or cancellation during download aborts installation and restores backup

07

Version selection excludes prereleases and incompatible versions, and requires same source repository

Risk score

Why this scored 63/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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