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Low 30 Bitcoin

feat: support sending to BOLT12 offers (#2581) (#4169)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by UniSyncInc2212

93/100 · Strong
feat: support sending to BOLT12 offers (#2581) (#4169)

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: UniSyncInc2212 <UniSyncInc2212@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Vlad Stan <stan.v.vlad@gmail.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for paying BOLT12 offers in LNbits, a Bitcoin Lightning wallet platform. It introduces new code paths for parsing offers, validating amounts, routing payments through compatible funding sources, and updating payment records when the actual invoice is resolved. The change is a feature addition, not a documented security fix. While it touches payment logic, the diff does not show an obvious vulnerability, but it does add complexity and new trust boundaries that could harbor bugs.

Recommended action

Treat this as a routine feature commit, not a confirmed security patch. Reviewers should audit the new BOLT12 parsing and payment-state transition logic for race conditions, amount confusion, and backend-specific error handling. Run the new regtest and unit tests, and consider a focused security review of `_set_resolved_offer_invoice` and the temporary `checking_id` handling before deploying to production.

Security signals we found

01

New payment path for BOLT12 offers introduces additional parsing and backend-specific logic

02

Temporary checking_id used for offers before real invoice resolution

03

Payment row fields (bolt11/payment_request/extra) are mutated after initial creation when a BOLT12 invoice is resolved

04

Amount validation enforces positive satoshi amount and max outgoing limit

05

Funding source capability check rejects unsupported backends before payment creation

06

No explicit security fix or vulnerability description in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 30/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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