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Low 35 Bitcoin

feat: Job scheduler (#4226)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Vlad Stan

55/100 · Thin
feat: Job scheduler (#4226)

Co-authored-by: alan <alan@lnbits.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new built-in job scheduler to LNbits. It lets core functions, Python extensions, and sandboxed WASM extensions register recurring cron-like tasks. The change is a feature addition, not a documented security fix. The scheduler introduces new database tables, APIs, and permission checks, so it expands the attack surface, but the code also includes several defensive controls: lease tokens, access checks, quotas, payload size limits, error redaction, and sandboxed execution for WASM jobs. There is no evidence in the commit of an active vulnerability or a known exploit.

Recommended action

Treat this as a routine feature commit with increased attack surface. Review the scheduler service and WASM scheduler API in a security audit, focusing on: (1) serializable quota enforcement, (2) lease/claim edge cases under concurrency, (3) history cleanup logic for interrupted runs, (4) payload validation and escaping, and (5) permission checks on every save/list/delete/execute path. No immediate patch is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

New privileged subsystem: persistent cron scheduler with database-backed jobs and run history

02

WASM sandbox integration for scheduled callbacks with policy-based admin approval

03

Atomic lease-based job claiming to prevent overlapping execution across workers

04

Access revocation on disabled users, deactivated extensions, and revoked WASM permissions

05

Payload size limit (8192 bytes) and HTML-sensitive character escaping in stored JSON

06

Error-message redaction for credentials/tokens/64-hex values

07

Per-user and per-extension job quotas for WASM schedules

08

Potential race in quota enforcement (count checked after existence check, not serializable)

09

History cleanup uses COALESCE(finished_at, started_at) which may affect interrupted runs

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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