fix: invalidate jwt token on password reset (#4248)
What changed, and why it matters
This commit fixes a security flaw in LNbits where changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate existing login sessions. Before the fix, someone who stole or obtained an old access token could keep using it even after the password was changed, because the system did not track that the password had been updated. The patch introduces a 'session revision' that is bumped whenever the password changes, so old tokens and two-factor challenges are rejected.
Deploy this patch promptly. Review any long-lived API integrations that may rely on access tokens surviving password changes, as they will now be forced to re-authenticate. Consider extending the same revision-bump logic to other credential-changing events such as username updates or 2FA enrollment changes.
Security signals we found
Fixes session/token invalidation on credential change
Adds atomic update of password hash and 2FA revision
Clears outstanding 2FA challenges on password change
Removes conditional bypass that skipped revision checks when 2FA was disabled
Includes regression tests covering password change, password reset, enrolled/unenrolled 2FA, and auth cache scenarios
Evidence from the diff
The patch adds update_account_credentials() and update_account_password() to atomically update an account’s password hash and two-factor configuration, bumping config.revision and clearing config.challenges. The password update and password reset endpoints in auth_api.py now call update_account_password() instead of the generic update_account(). The check_two_factor_session() guard now enforces revision matching for all sessions, not only when two-factor is enabled. Tests confirm that after a password change or reset, old access tokens, cookie tokens, and pending 2FA challenges return HTTP 401, while other users’ sessions remain valid.
Changed components
lnbits/core/crud/users.pylnbits/core/services/two_factor.pylnbits/core/views/auth_api.pytests/api/test_two_factor.pyInspect captured patch +145 / −9
diff --git a/lnbits/core/crud/users.py b/lnbits/core/crud/users.py
index 9f9cb1d..edafaa0 100644
--- a/lnbits/core/crud/users.py
+++ b/lnbits/core/crud/users.py
@@ -52,6 +52,30 @@ async def update_account(account: Account, conn: Connection | None = None) -> Ac
return account
+async def update_account_credentials(
+ account: Account,
+ config: TwoFactorConfig,
+ conn: Connection | None = None,
+) -> None:
+ """Save the password and session revision in a single atomic update."""
+ account.updated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+ await (conn or db).execute(
+ f"""
+ UPDATE accounts SET username = :username, password_hash = :password_hash,
+ updated_at = {db.timestamp_placeholder("updated_at")},
+ two_factor = :two_factor
+ WHERE id = :id
+ """, # noqa: S608
+ {
+ "id": account.id,
+ "username": account.username,
+ "password_hash": account.password_hash,
+ "updated_at": account.updated_at.timestamp(),
+ "two_factor": config.json(),
+ },
+ )
+
+
async def delete_account(user_id: str, conn: Connection | None = None) -> None:
await (conn or db).execute(
"DELETE from accounts WHERE id = :user",
diff --git a/lnbits/core/services/two_factor.py b/lnbits/core/services/two_factor.py
index d2d0e9e..80df1cc 100644
--- a/lnbits/core/services/two_factor.py
+++ b/lnbits/core/services/two_factor.py
@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ from lnbits.core.crud.settings import (
from lnbits.core.crud.users import (
get_two_factor_config,
save_two_factor_config,
+ update_account_credentials,
)
-from lnbits.core.models.users import AccessTokenPayload, TwoFactorConfig
+from lnbits.core.models.users import AccessTokenPayload, Account, TwoFactorConfig
from lnbits.db import Connection
from lnbits.settings import UpdateSettings, settings
@@ -262,6 +263,14 @@ async def session_payload(
)
+async def update_account_password(account: Account) -> None:
+ async with _two_factor_lock(account.id):
+ config = await get_two_factor_config(account.id)
+ config.revision = secrets.token_hex(16)
+ config.challenges.clear()
+ await update_account_credentials(account, config)
+
+
async def sync_two_factor_policy() -> str:
"""Invalidate old MFA claims when policy changes, including via environment."""
fingerprint = json.dumps(
@@ -330,10 +339,6 @@ async def check_two_factor_session(
raise HTTPException(
HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN, "Impersonation cannot change account security."
)
- if not settings.lnbits_two_factor_enabled and not (
- payload and payload.mfa_revision
- ):
- return
config = await get_two_factor_config(actor or user_id, conn)
if payload and config.revision != payload.mfa_revision:
raise two_factor_error("Account security changed. Please log in again.")
diff --git a/lnbits/core/views/auth_api.py b/lnbits/core/views/auth_api.py
index 12e6c29..da8bb60 100644
--- a/lnbits/core/views/auth_api.py
+++ b/lnbits/core/views/auth_api.py
@@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ from lnbits.core.models.users import (
UpdateAccessControlList,
)
from lnbits.core.services import create_user_account
-from lnbits.core.services.two_factor import issue_challenge, session_payload
+from lnbits.core.services.two_factor import (
+ issue_challenge,
+ session_payload,
+ update_account_password,
+)
from lnbits.core.services.users import (
check_register_activation_settings,
update_user_account,
@@ -535,7 +539,7 @@ async def update_password(
account.username = data.username
account.hash_password(data.password)
- await update_account(account)
+ await update_account_password(account)
_user = await get_user_from_account(account)
if not _user:
raise HTTPException(HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, "User not found.")
@@ -578,7 +582,7 @@ async def reset_password(data: ResetUserPassword) -> JSONResponse:
raise HTTPException(HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, "User not found.")
account.hash_password(data.password)
- await update_account(account)
+ await update_account_password(account)
return await _login_response(account)
diff --git a/tests/api/test_payment_status_api.py b/tests/api/test_payment_status_api.py
index a1f70b7..c6bca98 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_payment_status_api.py
+++ b/tests/api/test_payment_status_api.py
@@ -397,6 +397,8 @@ async def test_change_status_service_fee_is_credited_once(
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def notification_tasks(mocker):
tasks = []
+ # Background admin alerts must not enter the captured payment task list.
+ mocker.patch("lnbits.core.services.notifications.send_notification_in_background")
mocker.patch(
"lnbits.core.services.notifications.create_task", side_effect=tasks.append
)
diff --git a/tests/api/test_two_factor.py b/tests/api/test_two_factor.py
index d3b1a20..1ebbc66 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_two_factor.py
+++ b/tests/api/test_two_factor.py
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@ from lnbits.core.services.two_factor import (
from lnbits.core.services.users import create_user_account
from lnbits.core.views.auth_api import _handle_sso_login
from lnbits.core.views.user_api import api_users_reset_password
-from lnbits.helpers import create_access_token
+from lnbits.helpers import create_access_token, sha256s
from lnbits.settings import AuthMethods
+from lnbits.utils.cache import cache
from lnbits.utils.nostr import sign_event
pytestmark = pytest.mark.anyio
@@ -184,6 +185,106 @@ async def test_two_factor_user_id_and_cached_session_cannot_bypass(
assert response.json()["two_factor_required"]
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["password", "reset"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("enrolled", [False, True])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("cache_minutes", [0, 5])
+async def test_password_update_revokes_sessions(
+ http_client, factor_account, settings, operation, enrolled, cache_minutes
+):
+ settings.auth_authentication_cache_minutes = cache_minutes
+ settings.lnbits_two_factor_enabled = enrolled
+ if enrolled:
+ _, session = await enroll(http_client, factor_account)
+ else:
+ session = (await login(http_client, factor_account)).json()
+ old_token = session["access_token"]
+
+ other_account = Account(
+ id=uuid4().hex,
+ username="other_" + uuid4().hex[:8],
+ password_hash=factor_account.password_hash,
+ )
+ await create_user_account(other_account)
+ other_login = await login(http_client, other_account)
+ assert other_login.status_code == 200
+ other_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {other_login.json()['access_token']}"}
+ http_client.cookies.clear()
+ headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {old_token}"}
+ for path in ("/api/v1/wallets", "/api/v1/wallet/paginated"):
+ assert (await http_client.get(path, headers=headers)).status_code == 200
+ if cache_minutes:
+ assert cache.get(f"auth:access_token:{sha256s(old_token)}")
+
+ challenge = await issue_challenge(factor_account.id)
+ before = await get_two_factor_config(factor_account.id)
+ if operation == "password":
+ response = await http_client.put(
+ "/api/v1/auth/password",
+ headers=headers,
+ json={
+ "user_id": factor_account.id,
+ "username": factor_account.username,
+ "password_old": "secret1234",
+ "password": "newsecret1234",
+ "password_repeat": "newsecret1234",
+ },
+ )
+ else:
+ reset_key = await api_users_reset_password(factor_account.id)
+ response = await http_client.put(
+ "/api/v1/auth/reset",
+ json={
+ "reset_key": reset_key,
+ "password": "newsecret1234",
+ "password_repeat": "newsecret1234",
+ },
+ )
+ assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
+ if operation == "reset" and not enrolled:
+ assert (await http_client.get("/api/v1/wallets")).status_code == 200
+
+ after = await get_two_factor_config(factor_account.id)
+ assert after.revision and after.revision != before.revision
+ assert challenge.jti not in after.challenges
+ assert not before.challenges.keys() & after.challenges.keys()
+ assert (
+ after.copy(
+ update={"revision": before.revision, "challenges": before.challenges}
+ )
+ == before
+ )
+
+ http_client.cookies.clear()
+ for path in ("/api/v1/wallets", "/api/v1/wallet/paginated"):
+ assert (await http_client.get(path, headers=headers)).status_code == 401
+ http_client.cookies.set("cookie_access_token", old_token)
+ assert (await http_client.get(path)).status_code == 401
+ http_client.cookies.clear()
+ challenge_headers = {
+ "Authorization": f"Bearer {create_access_token(challenge.dict())}"
+ }
+ assert (
+ await http_client.get("/api/v1/auth/2fa/status", headers=challenge_headers)
+ ).status_code == 401
+ assert (
+ await http_client.get("/api/v1/wallets", headers=other_headers)
+ ).status_code == 200
+
+ response = await http_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth",
+ json={"username": factor_account.username, "password": "newsecret1234"},
+ )
+ assert response.status_code == 200
+ if enrolled:
+ assert response.json()["two_factor_required"]
+ response = await http_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/2fa/verify", json={"code": session["recovery_codes"][0]}
+ )
+ assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
+ assert (await http_client.get("/api/v1/wallets")).status_code == 200
+ assert (await http_client.get("/api/v1/wallet/paginated")).status_code == 200
+
+
async def test_two_factor_mandatory_enrollment_only(
http_client, factor_account, settings
):
Why this scored 72/100
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