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Low 36 Bitcoin

fix: probe Blink fee before paying to avoid max-fee reserve (#4076)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by pretyflaco

97/100 · Strong
fix: probe Blink fee before paying to avoid max-fee reserve (#4076)

Co-authored-by: Vlad Stan <stan.v.vlad@gmail.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change updates LNbits so that when using the Blink Bitcoin Lightning wallet, it first asks Blink's backend to estimate the routing fee before sending a payment. Previously, Blink would reserve the maximum possible fee and later refund any overpayment. The new behavior helps avoid tying up extra funds in fee reserves. It also adds a safety check that cancels the payment if the estimated fee exceeds the user's fee limit, and provides a fallback setting to send anyway when fee probing is not possible (for example, with certain invoice types).

Recommended action

Review and merge if the fee-limit logic and fallback behavior match project expectations. Operators using Blink should consider whether the default send-without-probe fallback is acceptable for their risk model, and may disable it if they require strict fee estimation before every payment.

Security signals we found

01

Adds pre-payment fee validation to prevent spending more in routing fees than configured

02

Introduces a configurable fallback that can fail closed (blink_send_without_probe=false) when fee estimation is unavailable

03

Prevents unnecessary max-fee reserve lockups with Blink, improving wallet liquidity

04

Adds test coverage for fee-exceeds-limit, probe failure, and zero-amount invoice paths

Risk score

Why this scored 36/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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