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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

descriptor: require type B for the top level miniscript in sh()/wsh()

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by odudex

50/100 · Thin
descriptor: require type B for the top level miniscript in sh()/wsh()
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens validation for Bitcoin descriptors that wrap a miniscript inside sh() (pay-to-script-hash) or wsh() (pay-to-witness-script-hash). Previously, the library accepted any miniscript fragment as the top-level child, even fragments that are not valid standalone scripts (for example, a fragment that only pushes a public key or verifies a signature but leaves a value on the stack). The change now rejects those malformed descriptors before they can be used to create addresses or transactions. The risk is that an attacker or buggy wallet could trick a user into accepting a descriptor whose script does not behave as expected, potentially making funds unspendable or enabling unexpected spending conditions.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant correctness fix. Upgrade to a version containing this commit, especially if your application parses or accepts user-supplied descriptors. Review any previously accepted sh()/wsh() descriptors to confirm their top-level miniscript is type B, and avoid using descriptors parsed before this fix for address generation or transaction signing without re-validation.

Security signals we found

01

Input-validation hardening for descriptor parsing

02

Rejection of non-top-level miniscript fragments in script wrappers

03

New negative test vectors for malformed descriptors

04

Potential for funds to become unspendable or for unexpected script semantics if malformed descriptors were accepted

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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