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Low 47 Bitcoin

internal: mark internal functions as hidden visibility when possible

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jon Griffiths

73/100 · Adequate
internal: mark internal functions as hidden visibility when possible

Even when building with -fvisibility=hidden, some internal functions
(those that aren't static and thus provably limited to a single
compilation unit) are not marked hidden. As a result, calls to them from
within the library are routed through the PLT. This can result in
register data containing secrets/partial secrets being spilled to the
stack.

Mark such internal functions as hidden so internal calls to them avoid
the PLT call mechanism.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change is a hardening patch for a cryptocurrency wallet library. It tells the compiler to keep certain internal helper functions private to the library, so calls to them stay inside the library instead of going through an external lookup table (the PLT). The commit message says the old route could cause CPU register values containing secret key material to be temporarily saved to the stack, where they might be more easily exposed in a crash dump or memory leak. The patch reduces that risk but does not by itself fix a specific, independently reported vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat as a worthwhile hardening patch. Review whether any other non-static internal functions were missed, verify the macro is correctly honored by the toolchain, and consider backporting to release branches. No immediate incident response is warranted because no specific vulnerability or exploit is disclosed.

Security signals we found

01

Hardening against secret material leakage via stack spills

02

Compiler/linker visibility hardening

03

PLT/GOT indirection reduction

04

Defense-in-depth for cryptographic helper functions

Risk score

Why this scored 47/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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