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Informational 21 Bitcoin

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1980: examples: randomize the context in musig, erase the keypair in schnorr

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by merge-script

81/100 · Strong
Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1980: examples: randomize the context in musig, erase the keypair in schnorr

608d12faa157e9185b843a2669d0f9e9a7554305 examples: randomize the context in musig, erase the keypair in schnorr (Ferdinando Ametrano)

Pull request description:

examples/musig.c is the only example that handles secret keys without
randomizing the context, which secp256k1.h highly recommends. Randomize
it as schnorr.c does.

schnorr.c erases the secret key buffer after use, but the keypair holds
a copy of the secret key and stayed on the stack. Erase it too.

ACKs for top commit:
theStack:
re-ACK 608d12faa157e9185b843a2669d0f9e9a7554305

Tree-SHA512: ec1de541687c121663469848ae82af02c2bd87f8b0a5037017ed1f8927f72a48ae8ddd76544aba66941b80ef35053fc232c8d7c4887541dbe6199fa3e05d5a13
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change improves two example programs in the secp256k1 cryptographic library. It adds a recommended side-channel protection step to the multi-signature example (musig.c) and ensures the single-signature example (schnorr.c) also wipes a second copy of the secret key from memory. These are hardening fixes in demonstration code, not the library itself, so they do not directly fix an exploitable vulnerability in production use.

Recommended action

Treat as a minor hardening improvement in example code. Users should ensure their own applications using libsecp256k1 follow the documented recommendations to randomize contexts and erase secret material. No urgent action is required for the library itself.

Security signals we found

01

Context randomization added to protect against side-channel leakage

02

Secret key material explicitly erased from keypair object after use

03

Changes are confined to example code, not the core library

04

No CVE, advisory, or vendor security disclosure referenced in commit

Risk score

Why this scored 21/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 3/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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