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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #573 from LedgerHQ/misc-fixes

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Salvatore Ingala

53/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #573 from LedgerHQ/misc-fixes

Miscellaneous fixes
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes three separate safety checks in Ledger's Bitcoin app. First, it prevents the app from building a response larger than the APDU buffer, which could previously overwrite the status word. Second, it refuses to register wallet policies containing multisig setups inside old-style P2SH scripts with more than 15 public keys, because Bitcoin consensus rejects scripts larger than 520 bytes. Third, it now rejects wallet policies at registration time that the device would later be unable to sign for, specifically policies where a single MuSig2 group contains more than one internal key, or where more than 8 key expressions involve internal keys. These are hardening fixes rather than a single critical vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat this as a defensive hardening patch. Review whether the APDU response overflow condition was reachable from any command path and whether existing signing flows could have registered unspendable policies. No immediate emergency action is indicated by the diff alone, but the app should be updated to include these checks.

Security signals we found

01

Buffer-boundary fix in APDU response construction (off-by-one / potential out-of-bounds status word write)

02

New consensus-level limit enforcement for legacy P2SH multisig redeem scripts (520-byte push limit)

03

New registration-time policy validation to prevent registering wallets the device cannot later sign for

04

Addition of specific error codes and test coverage for the new rejection conditions

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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