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Low 25 Bitcoin

fix: pin gcc base image by digest

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by odudex

57/100 · Thin
fix: pin gcc base image by digest
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change locks the Docker build to one specific, unchangeable version of the GCC compiler image by adding a cryptographic fingerprint (SHA digest). Without this, an attacker who compromises the GCC image registry could silently replace the 'gcc:12-bookworm' image with a malicious one, potentially injecting backdoors into Krux firmware builds. Pinning by digest prevents the build from accepting a substituted image, but it does not fix any already-known vulnerability in the code itself.

Recommended action

Adopt digest pinning for all base images and consider also pinning apt package versions, verifying checksums of downloaded toolchains, and using reproducible/verified build pipelines. This commit is a good incremental hardening step and should be merged.

Security signals we found

01

Docker base image changed from mutable tag to digest-pinned reference

02

Supply-chain / build-integrity hardening

03

Prevents registry tag-replacement attacks for the gcc:12-bookworm image

04

No runtime code or cryptographic logic changed

Risk score

Why this scored 25/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 3/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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