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Moderate 62 Bitcoin

feat: warn when PSBT input amounts cannot be verified

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by odudex

90/100 · Strong
feat: warn when PSBT input amounts cannot be verified

BIP143 commits only to the amount of the input being signed, so a
coordinator can declare a different input truthfully in each of two
sessions and combine one valid signature per input. Warn when a
non-taproot PSBT has more than one input and any amount is unbacked
by its previous transaction.

The warning states the risk rather than instructing the user, since a
malicious retry request is indistinguishable from a failed transfer,
and signing the same transaction twice is legitimate when one person
holds more than one key of a multisig.

Translations for the two new strings are still pending.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a warning screen to Krux, a hardware signing device, when it is asked to sign a multi-input Bitcoin transaction where the amounts of some inputs cannot be independently verified. The risk is that a malicious transaction coordinator could trick a user into paying a much higher fee than shown, or into signing away more money than intended, by lying about input amounts during separate signing sessions. The patch does not block signing; it only warns the user and asks whether to proceed. It also does not fix the underlying cryptographic gap in older SegWit (BIP143) signatures, which is why the warning is needed.

Recommended action

Users should upgrade to a release containing this commit and carefully read the new warning. Developers should consider whether the residual risk of allowing user override is acceptable, or whether an optional strict mode that rejects unverified multi-input SegWit PSBTs should be added. Wallet coordinators used with Krux should be configured to include non-witness UTXO data for SegWit inputs when possible.

Security signals we found

01

New user-facing warning for unverified multi-input SegWit amounts

02

Detection logic tied to BIP143 signature semantics and inp.is_verified

03

Does not enforce previous-transaction inclusion; user can still proceed

04

Residual exposure explicitly documented in skipped test comment

05

No CVE, vendor advisory, or independent researcher attribution in commit

Risk score

Why this scored 62/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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