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Moderate 60 Bitcoin

Fix: Reject multisig policies with m=0 or m>n and guard against ZeroDivisionError in fee calculation and (#845)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Odudex

93/100 · Strong
Fix: Reject multisig policies with m=0 or m>n and guard against ZeroDivisionError in fee calculation and (#845)

* fix: guard against ZeroDivisionError in fee calculation for zero-value outputs

* fix: validate multisig quorum m>0 and m<=n in key-value wallet files

* chore: bump version to 26.03.01

* fix: Be more specific about invalid multisig quorum errors
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This update fixes two security issues in Krux, a Bitcoin signing device. First, it prevents the device from crashing when calculating fees for transactions that send no regular bitcoin (only data outputs like OP_RETURN). Second, it now rejects invalid multisig wallet setups where zero signatures are required or where more signatures are required than keys exist, which could otherwise allow unauthorized or impossible spending rules.

Recommended action

Users should upgrade to Krux v26.03.1. Developers should review whether other PSBT parsing paths assume non-zero output amounts and ensure all wallet import formats validate multisig quorums consistently.

Security signals we found

01

CHANGELOG explicitly lists both changes under 'Security Fixes'

02

Fixes ZeroDivisionError in fee calculation for zero-value output PSBTs

03

Adds multisig quorum validation: rejects m=0 and m>n

04

Test comments reference external audit findings (C7, C8)

05

Defense-in-depth: validation added at both descriptor and key-value file parsing layers

Risk score

Why this scored 60/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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