AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 59 Bitcoin

fix: zcash sapling checking

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by soralit

47/100 · Thin
fix: zcash sapling checking
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a validation gap in the Keystone hardware wallet's Zcash transaction checking code. Previously, a partially-created Zcash transaction (PCZT) could claim a non-zero Sapling shielded value even when the Sapling bundle contained no actual inputs or outputs. The fix now rejects such inconsistent PCZTs before signing. If accepted, a malformed transaction could potentially mislead the user about value flows or lead to an invalid signature.

Recommended action

Review whether `validate_sapling_bundle_consistency()` should also be invoked in any other PCZT check/parse paths (e.g., before signing) to ensure the malformed input cannot reach later stages. Confirm the regression test runs in CI for the `cypherpunk` feature.

Security signals we found

01

Input-validation bug in transaction parsing/checking

02

Missing consistency check between value sum and bundle presence

03

Regression test added for malformed PCZT rejection

04

Fix applies to cypherpunk feature code path only

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.