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Low 35 Bitcoin

feat(nufi-tron): update nufi-tron support

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by qkin

57/100 · Thin
feat(nufi-tron): update nufi-tron support
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new way for the Keystone hardware wallet to handle Tron (TRX) transactions sent as plain JSON sign requests, alongside the older Keystone-specific format. It introduces code that parses JSON, derives the sender address from the seed, checks it matches the 'from' field, and signs. The change is a feature addition, not a clearly labeled security fix. There are no obvious catastrophic bugs in the diff, but the new path adds complexity and a few places where input validation could be tightened.

Recommended action

Treat as a feature commit requiring normal security review rather than an emergency patch. Review the new JSON parsing path for malformed input handling, ensure base58check decoding failures cannot be confused with valid addresses, verify the address-derivation check cannot be bypassed, and confirm the legacy Keystone Tron handler remains safe if still reachable via test commands or other code paths.

Security signals we found

01

New transaction parsing path from untrusted JSON input (serde_json::Value then protoc::TronTx)

02

Address-ownership check added before signing (derived address vs. JSON 'from' field)

03

Use of keccak256 with slicing `digest[12..]` to form 20-byte TRON address

04

Default derivation path fallback to `m/44'/195'/0'/0/0` when request omits path

05

Legacy Keystone Tron path left intact but no longer used by UI

06

No explicit bounds/length checks visible on JSON string fields or base58 inputs in the diff

07

No commit message or vendor reference indicating this is a security fix

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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