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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

refactor: multisig

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by soralit

30/100 · Opaque
refactor: multisig
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a logic bug in how Bitcoin multisig wallet policies are validated and cleans up several related code paths. The most important change corrects a flawed condition that could have allowed invalid or nonsensical multisig policies (for example, a threshold of zero or a threshold larger than the total number of signers) to be accepted. It also improves memory safety by adding proper cleanup of secret seed data and freeing a previously unfreed response object, and it removes weak-symbol function stubs that could have led to unexpected behavior when Bitcoin-only features are disabled.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant fix and include it in the next firmware release. Review whether the old policy-validation bug was reachable through user-facing multisig creation flows, and consider whether any invalid wallets created with the buggy logic need migration or re-validation. Audit other uses of CHECK_ERRCODE_RETURN for macro signature compatibility.

Security signals we found

01

Corrected boolean logic flaw in multisig policy validation that could allow invalid threshold/total combinations

02

Fixed swapped argument order in policy validation call

03

Added missing free method for Response<MultiSigWallet> to prevent memory leaks

04

Replaced weak-symbol function stubs with explicit BTC_ONLY-gated static implementations to avoid unintended fallback behavior

05

Added secure clearing of seed material and secret cache on all exit paths in multisig wallet import flow

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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