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Low 28 Bitcoin

chore: update ui

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by soralit

40/100 · Thin
chore: update ui
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit refactors how TON (The Open Network) transactions are displayed on the Keystone 3 hardware wallet. Previously, the code assumed every transaction had exactly one message. Now it supports multiple messages, showing each one separately on screen. The change also fixes a small bug where a proof-result pointer was incorrectly cleared, and adds a safety check when parsing contract data JSON. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability being fixed, but supporting multi-message transactions is a meaningful hardening improvement because a malicious or unusual transaction with several messages could previously have been misrepresented or mishandled.

Recommended action

Review whether the previous single-message design could have caused a user to approve a transaction containing hidden or unexpected additional messages. Consider adding explicit tests for multi-message jetton/NFT transfers and for malformed contract_data JSON. Verify that the C UI correctly frees the new VecFFI message array and that the pointer-clearing macro fix is applied consistently elsewhere.

Security signals we found

01

Multi-message TON transaction support added, reducing risk of UI misrepresentation when more than one transfer is present

02

Single-message assumption removed from transaction parsing and display

03

Pointer-clearing bug fixed in TON proof cleanup macro (`g_proofParseResult` vs `g_parseResult`)

04

NULL check added after `cJSON_Parse` of contract_data before dereferencing

05

Default simulator feature changed from cypherpunk to multi-coins (build/config change, not a runtime security signal)

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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