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Moderate 57 Bitcoin

fix ar bugs

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ww3512687

0/100 · Opaque
fix ar bugs
! Very short subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes several bugs in the firmware of the Keystone 3 hardware wallet, mainly around how Arweave (AR) cryptocurrency keys and RSA prime numbers are handled. It replaces direct array indexing with safer lookups, adds checks for missing or corrupted data, stores a hash of sensitive RSA primes in a secure chip, and erases that data when an account is deleted. The changes reduce the chance that a malformed or out-of-range value could cause the device to read the wrong key, crash, or leave sensitive key material behind after deletion.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant hardening patch. Review whether the old direct-indexing paths were reachable from user-supplied chain values or persisted data, and confirm that the new SE hash page is correctly provisioned on existing devices (the VerifySeHash helper writes the expected hash if the page is empty, which could mask downgrade/rollback detection). Validate that all call sites of GetCurrentAccountPublicKey/GetCurrentAccountPath/GetXPubPath handle NULL returns safely.

Security signals we found

01

Out-of-bounds index fix: ChainType enum no longer used directly as array index for g_chainTable/g_accountPublicInfo

02

Sensitive-data cleanup: RSA prime flash region and SE hash are erased when an account is deleted

03

Tamper-response expansion: anti_tamper erase loop now covers the new RSA primes hash page

04

Integrity check addition: RSA primes must match both flash hash and secure-element hash

05

Input validation: Arweave setup check now validates hex string length instead of raw strlen

06

Memory/IO error handling: added null checks and error-code propagation in RSA flash read path

Risk score

Why this scored 57/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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