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Low 33 Bitcoin

rpc: default raw signing to rangeproof-committing sighash when dynafed active

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Byron Hambly

73/100 · Adequate
rpc: default raw signing to rangeproof-committing sighash when dynafed active

Default the raw signing RPCs to commit to output rangeproofs when dynafed
is active at the current tip. The SignTransaction util gains a
sighash_rangeproof_active parameter and, when no sighash is supplied,
resolves the default via DefaultSighashType. Wire this through
signrawtransactionwithkey and descriptorprocesspsbt using
DeploymentActiveAfter(DEPLOYMENT_DYNA_FED) for tip activation. Explicit
user-supplied sighash types are left untouched.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Elements blockchain software creates and checks digital signatures for raw transactions. Once a network upgrade called 'dynafed' is active, the software now defaults to a signature type that also commits to confidential transaction rangeproofs. It also fixes verification so signatures using that new default are accepted instead of rejected. The change is a protocol-alignment fix; it does not appear to introduce a security vulnerability, but it prevents a functional break where valid wallet signatures would be considered invalid.

Recommended action

Review that DefaultSighashType and DeploymentActiveAfter behave correctly at activation boundaries and during reorgs. Ensure tests cover both pre-dynafed and post-dynafed signing/verification paths, including PSBT finalization. No immediate incident response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

New consensus-relevant sighash default gated by dynafed activation

02

Verification flag added to accept previously rejected signature type

03

Raw transaction signing behavior change for RPC callers

04

PSBT finalization path updated to match signing default

Risk score

Why this scored 33/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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