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Low 34 Bitcoin

lnpeer: don't save our own channel update as remote upd

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by f321x

88/100 · Strong
lnpeer: don't save our own channel update as remote upd

I noticed CLN is sending our own channel update to us on
reestablishment, we then assume it to be the remote nodes
update and try to verify the signature against their pubkey
which fails and throws `InvalidGossipMsg`.

This adds a check preventing us from trying to save our own
channel updates as remote update.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Lightning Network code where, after reconnecting to another node, Electrum could mistakenly treat its own channel settings message as coming from the remote peer. That caused a signature verification failure and an InvalidGossipMsg error, potentially disrupting the Lightning connection or channel state handling. The fix checks who originated the message and ignores it if it came from Electrum itself.

Recommended action

Apply the patch. It is a defensive correctness fix that prevents a denial-of-service/disruption scenario in Lightning peer reestablishment. No immediate incident response is indicated unless users are experiencing InvalidGossipMsg errors during channel reconnects.

Security signals we found

01

Signature verification failure (InvalidGossipMsg) caused by accepting own gossip as remote

02

Lightning channel reestablishment message handling bug

03

Potential channel state desynchronization or connection disruption

04

No authentication bypass or cryptographic weakness introduced

Risk score

Why this scored 34/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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